Abstract. I estimate the implied costs of shareholder monitoring by modeling activism as a sequential decision process, in which activists choose a more hostile tactic after less confrontational approaches fail. The sequential de…nition provides a more accurate description of activism and motivates a structural model, which I estimate empirically using a comprehensive hand-collected dataset of 1492 hedge fund campaigns between 2000 and 2007. I …nd that the average activist campaign costs $10.5 million. Half of this cost comes from the proxy stage. Initial demand negotiations are the second most expensive activist tactic, followed by board representation. I also introduce a more narrow de…nition of campaign success, which reduces in half the previously reported success estimates. The high costs and low success rate of activism suggest that its net gains are substantially lower than previously thought.
Introduction
The separation of ownership and control generates signi…cant con ‡icts of interest between managers and shareholders. The market for corporate control can moderate these agency con ‡icts. However, small shareholders may lack the proper incentives to discipline company insiders due to free-riding (Grossman and Hart (1980) ). Shleifer and Vishny (1986) discuss the role of large shareholders in mitigating the free-rider problem.
Shareholder activists are blockholders who purchase minority stakes in public companies with the intention of in ‡uencing major corporate policies. The trade-o¤ between the private costs and the shared bene…ts of control determines the activist's incentives to monitor e¤ectively. In order to understand this trade-o¤, we need to evaluate both the bene…ts and the costs of activism.
Recent academic work has shown that (hedge fund) activism generates abnormal marketadjusted returns both in absolute terms and in comparison to passive investing (Brav, Jiang, Partnoy and Thomas (2009), Klein and Zur (2009) , Cli¤ord (2009) ). 2 However, most evidence about the costs of activism is anecdotal and incomplete.
My goal in this paper is to estimate the costs of shareholder monitoring implied by the activist's decision-making behavior. I propose a novel de…nition of activism as a sequence of decision steps, in which activists choose a more hostile tactic only after less confrontational approaches fail. Under this de…nition, the process starts with the initial …ling of activist intentions with the Securities and Exchange Commission (de…ned as stage 0), followed by the formal communication of speci…c demands to the target …rm (stage 1). Depending on the outcome of private demand negotiations, the activist may decide to terminate the campaign, or request board representation (stage 2), which allows for a more direct interaction with company insiders. If the activist is denied board representation, he/she can solicit input from other shareholders (stage 3), and eventually wage a proxy …ght (stage 4).
I estimate the costs of each stage (tactic) of the activist process -demand negotiations, board representation and proxy contest. In addition, I answer many important questions that have not received enough attention in the previous academic literature: Does activism generate positive net gains? How important are unobservable costs (such as the activist's time and e¤ort) in relation to legal and disclosure expenses? Which phase of the activist process is the most costly? Are confrontational approaches more expensive, and do they have higher success rates? What is the role of governance in implementing the activist's stated objectives? The answers to these questions provide a more in-depth understanding of activism.
The sequential de…nition of activism can be presented theoretically as a dynamic discrete-choice model. It features a single activist and a target …rm trading at a discount from fundamental value.
Only a shareholder activist has the expertise and motivation to e¤ectively monitor and eliminate the discount, which represents the activist's expected reward if the intervention is successful. The activist chooses the optimal sequence of tactics in communicating with the target based on a cost-bene…t analysis of monitoring. High-e¤ort tactics are more likely to result in success but are also more costly. This is the main trade-o¤ facing the activist.
The model assumes that costs vary with the choice of tactic but are independent of campaign characteristics such as expected net reward, activist ownership, etc. In this view, tactic-speci…c unobservable variables (such as the activist's time and e¤ort) determine the costs of each stage. Put di¤erently, the cost of human capital, not investment capital, is what drives the activist's decision to continue a campaign. Cli¤ord (2009) similarly argues that "it is the unobservable costs (time and e¤ort of the hedge fund manager...) that dominate the costs of activism." (p.335)
The theoretical model motivates the estimation technique, which combines the assumptions of random utility theory with the intuition of backward induction. The estimation not only preserves the main structural elements of the activist's economic decision-making process but also provides the identi…cation restriction required for consistent estimates of the cost parameters. The regression equation is a random utility transformation of the activist's break-even constraint, and is straightforward to estimate by standard statistical software. An additional bene…t of the estimation approach is that it signi…cantly reduces the measurement error induced by our imperfect knowledge of the utility of each decision alternative. Section 4 of Schedule 13D (Purpose of the Transaction) is the single most important source of information for this study. In Section 4, the activist announces his/her investment intent and preferred monitoring approach, which allows me to track the sequence of tactics an activist uses throughout a campaign. In addition, Item 4 details the activist's demands, which can be broadly classi…ed into …ve main categories -corporate governance, strategic alternatives, corporate structure, opposition to a proposed transaction and general undervaluation. The paper's main contributions are empirical. I …nd that the average campaign that reaches a proxy …ght costs $10.5 million. In terms of invested capital, this amount represents 12% of the mean activist ownership stake. The estimated monitoring costs are economically signi…cant both in absolute terms and in terms of net returns. Subtracting costs signi…cantly reduces deal returns.
The mean (median) gross deal return drops from 55.69% (1.31%) to 19.4% (-2.10%). This …nding suggests that the net returns from activism are signi…cantly lower than previously thought.
As anticipated, the proxy contest stage has the highest cost equal to $5.81 million for the average campaign. The bias-corrected bootstrap con…dence interval for the proxy stage is between $2.67 million and $10.10 million. Demand negotiations are the second most expensive stage, with average costs of $2.73 million and a 95% con…dence interval between $0.33 million and $6.94 million. Unlike the proxy contest stage, most of the costs of demand negotiations are unobservable and can only be estimated through a structural approach. Board representation adds another $1.97 million to the cost of the average campaign, with a 95% con…dence interval between $0.48 and $4.02 million. This paper di¤ers from the previous literature in other important respects. Previous studies of hedge fund activism classify most activist demands as corporate-governance related . As governance changes are usually widely-supported by most shareholders, they are often fully or partially implemented. This fact alone results in a very high estimate for the success rate of activism -about 50% in most studies. I consider board representation (governance demands in general) as a crucial step of the activist process but not its ultimate goal. The data con…rms that in less than 5% of all events the primary demand is corporate-governance related. Under a more narrow de…nition of success in terms of the execution of the activist's primary objective, I …nd success in only 19.11% of all campaigns between 2000 and 2007.
Breaking the activist process into a sequence of escalating tactics also allows me to provide a more …ne-grained description of its evolution. I …nd that the most successful activist phase is the proxy contest, in which 67.19% of activists achieve their objectives. Proxy threats are e¤ective in 47.89% of the cases, while 47.80% of activists achieve success through board representation. This compares to a meager 6.67% success rate of demand negotiations.
The comparison of success rates to continuation rates provides interesting insights into the activist's decision-making process. About 70% of activists quit before making formal demands to the target. This suggests that the transition to demand negotiations represents a signi…cant impediment in the overall process. Only 20% of activists request board representation, and less than 5% enter the proxy stage even though it has the highest success rate. This implies that the costs of activist monitoring may be a signi…cant factor in the decision whether to continue a campaign to success.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the related academic literature.
Section 3 describes the data and introduces a new de…nition of activism as a sequential decision process. Section 4 develops the theoretical model and Section 5 discusses the estimation technique. Section 6 summarizes the descriptive evidence on the activist process. Section 7 reviews the main empirical results. Section 8 concludes.
Literature Review
A common approach in the theoretical literature on shareholder activism is to consider the trade-o¤ between intervention and other factors (liquidity or risk aversion) which may reduce the investor's incentives to monitor (see Kahn and Winton (1998) , Maug (1998) and Bolton and von Thadden (1998) ). The theoretical model proposed in this paper di¤ers from the previous literature in several respects. First, I model the activist process as a sequence of escalating tactics, in which activists choose a more hostile tactic after less confrontational approaches fail. Second, I focus on the principal cost-bene…t trade-o¤ facing the activist and study its e¤ect on the choice of tactics in communicating with the target. Third, I use the theoretical model to motivate an estimation technique, which allows me to determine tactic-speci…c cost thresholds. The above papers have focused attention to the substantial returns from activism but have largely ignored its costs. My goal in this study is to measure the costs of activist monitoring and evaluate the net gains from activism. In that sense, the current paper is a major departure from the previous empirical literature. In item 4 of Schedule 13D the activist announces any plans or proposals with respect to the company. I group activist demands in …ve categories -corporate governance, strategic alternatives, corporate structure, opposition to a proposed transaction and general undervaluation. Activists who choose the last category without making subsequent demands can be considered passive investors.
In step 4, I supplement the sample with data from two additional sources. It is common for an activist to threaten a proxy …ght without actually …ling proxy materials with the SEC. For example, an activist may …le a preliminary statement soliciting materials from shareholders as a "scare tactic" to induce cooperation by the target. In order to di¤erentiate between a proxy threat and a proxy Previous empirical studies of hedge fund activism have also used mandatory regulatory …lings for data sample construction. However, none of the studies focused on the activists'choice of tactics or di¤erentiated between the distinct e¤ort stages of the activist process. Consequently, the dataset used here o¤ers a more accurate and in-depth look at activism.
New De…nition of the Activist Process
The …rst step in estimating the costs faced by an activist investor is understanding his/her decisionmaking behavior. The typical de…nition of shareholder activism does not consider the range of available tactics nor their order. However, activists commonly describe the process as a sequence of decision steps, in which more hostile tactics are chosen only if less confrontational approaches fail to produce results. The above anecdotes highlight two common patterns in the data. First, activists consider a range of tactics in their communication with a target -demand negotiations, board representation, proxy threat, and proxy …ght. Second, the use of tactics forms an escalating sequence from less hostile to more confrontational. In particular, the activist process usually starts with the communication of a set of demands to the …rm. Depending on the outcome of demand negotiations, the activist may decide to terminate the campaign, or request board representation, which allows for a more direct interaction with company insiders. If the activist does not obtain board representation, he/she can start soliciting input from other shareholders (preliminary proxy), and eventually wage a proxy …ght (see Figure 1 ).
Insert Figure 1 I de…ne the activist process as consisting of four consecutive decision steps following the initial …ling of Schedule 13D with the SEC (de…ned as stage 0). The disclosed investment intent in a …rst …ling is usually vague such as the target's "general market undervaluation" or "potential investment appreciation". Most 13D …lers never present speci…c demands, which makes them more similar to passive investors. However, they prove useful in establishing the …rst cost threshold associated with the transition from passive investing to activist monitoring. What makes the proposed sequential de…nition plausible? What prevents an activist from engaging in further confrontation once a preliminary agreement is reached with the target? The activist usually signs a board representation or standstill agreement, which explicitly prohibits the use of confrontational actions for a speci…ed period of time. 4 As clear from the letters by Jewelcor Management and Appaloosa, board representation (governance in general) is rarely the ultimate objective of a campaign. In most cases, the activist requests corporate governance changes (such as CEO removal or a 'poison pill'termination) as an intermediate step necessary for achieving a campaign's primary investment goal. The data con…rms that in less than 5% of the events, the principal activist demand is corporate-governance related.
This 'limited'view of governance as a means to an end has signi…cant implications for empirical research. First, board representation should be considered as an activist tactic, which is more involved than demand negotiations but less confrontational than a proxy …ght. Second, the success rate of an activist campaign should be measured in terms of executing the primary demand of the activist rather than the transitional steps required to achieve it. Both implications lead to results very di¤erent from those reported in previous empirical studies (see section 6 below).
Structural Model

Main Assumptions
The sequential de…nition of activism can be presented theoretically as a dynamic discrete-choice model featuring a risk-neutral activist and a target …rm. The activist assesses the target's position relative to an industry-determined benchmark and formulates a set of demands aimed at improving the …rm's market valuation. Consequently, the activist's intervention (if successful) is expected to result in a revaluation of the target relative to its industry peers.
The activist communicates a list of recommendations to the board of directors and learns about the board's willingness to implement the proposed demands. Higher-e¤ort (more confrontational) tactics have a higher probability of success but increase the overall cost of the campaign. As a result, the activist will choose higher-e¤ort tactics only if low-e¤ort approaches fail to produce the desired result. Thus, the principal trade-o¤ facing the activist is balancing the costs of monitoring with its bene…ts. 5 The typical activist campaign starts with an announcement of a list of demands aimed at correcting the …rm's under-performance relative to its industry.
Assumption 1
The target's current market price M it represents a discount from its fundamental value, V it . The discount can only be eliminated by an activist shareholder by means of a valueenhancing demand.
Consistent with the previous theoretical literature, the model assumes that only a large shareholder has the expertise and motivation to monitor e¤ectively (see Shleifer and Vishny (1986) , Kahn and Winton (1998) ). The discount re ‡ects the target's market position and is a su¢ cient statistic for the pro…tability of the campaign. In the empirical analysis, the discount is measured as a percentage of the di¤erence between the …rm's and the industry's valuation in terms of Tobin's q. De…ned in this way, the discount equals the activist's expected reward from monitoring. This is consistent with claims made in the recent literature that hedge fund activism is a form of value investing. 6 When less confrontational tactics do not lead to success, the activist can choose a more hostile approach. Intuitively, more confrontational (higher-e¤ort) tactics allow for a more direct interaction with the …rm resulting in a higher probability of success.
Assumption 2 E¤ ort is discrete and corresponds to commonly observed activist tactics. Speci…-cally, the activist's choice set is n 2 f0; 1; 2; 3; 4g, where 0 = activist …ling but no speci…c demands, 1 = formal demand negotiations, 2 = board representation, 3 = threatened proxy contest, 4 = proxy …ght. The available alternatives are mutually exclusive, exhaustive, and …nite.
Depending on the …rm's reaction, three scenarios can ensue. If the board responds positively, the activist privately monitors the …rm's progress in anticipation of a market revaluation. If the target reacts negatively, the activist can choose to exit (empirically the most common outcome), or select a more direct communication approach such as board representation. Similarly, a negative outcome from board negotiations is followed by an exit, or the choice of a more hostile tactic such as a proxy …ght. The activist's objective is to choose the optimal sequence of tactics (e¤ort levels) that will lead to the elimination of the …rm's discount without resulting in negative utility.
Higher-e¤ort tactics have a higher probability of success but are also more costly.
Assumption 3 Let c n denote the stage (e¤ ort) costs of activist monitoring. Costs are increasing in e¤ ort but independent of campaign-speci…c characteristics.
The last assumption suggests that the time and e¤ort of the activist rather than the opportunity cost of capital determine the costs of an intervention.
Dynamic E¤ort Choice
The model assumes that each stage of the activist process has a …xed duration equal to the time interval between two annual meetings (see the empirical section for supporting evidence). For example, it is conjectured that the activist requests board representation with an implicit horizon until the next annual meeting. At that time, the activist chooses whether to exit or escalate to the next stage depending on the outcome of board negotiations.
The activist's decision process can be described by a discrete-choice model, whose solution is obtained by backward induction. To preserve consistency with the empirical section, which treats the proxy threat and proxy …ght as one combined stage, I assume that activism consists of three distinct phases -demand negotiations, board representation and proxy contest. At each stage, the activist decides whether to continue based on a cost-bene…t analysis of monitoring, in which he/she compares the expected return from continuation to the expected cost of activist involvement. The net bene…t of continuation is then compared to the …rm's current market value.
Consider the activist's decision conditional on failure at stage 2 (board representation). The activist compares the utility from the two available alternatives -continue to a proxy …ght or sell at the current market price
c 3 = cost of the last campaign stage p i3 = probability of success in a proxy contest
The model assumes that the costs of each stage are common across activists and driven by the time and e¤ort associated with a particular tactic. 7 In addition, the rest of this section assumes that the activist's best estimate of tomorrow's …rm value is today's value, which explicitly precludes market timing. Also, the activist's current ownership is considered representative of the next period's ownership implying that i is not chosen strategically. Consequently, I drop the time (stage) subscripts for V i , M i and i .
The activist continues the campaign if
Here,
is the inverse of the activist's marked-to-market investment and
is the expected gross return if the campaign is successful. The above transformation simpli…es the exposition of the theoretical model and easily translates into an estimating equation (described below).
Next, consider the activist's decision conditional on failure at stage 1 (demand negotiations).
The available choices are selling at the current market price or requesting board representation.
The latter can result in selling upon failure of stage 2 or continuation to a proxy contest.
The activist's utility from continuation to a proxy contest can be written as
The expression in equation 4 needs to be compared to the activist's utility from selling upon failure of the board representation stagẽ
Combining equations 4 and 5, the activist requests board representation if
Following a similar line of reasoning, the activist initiates demand negotiations if the utility from continuationŨ i1 is positivẽ
In addition to its simplicity, the above model o¤ers several advantages. First, it provides a natural way to estimate the parameters of interest using a binary outcome model for each stage of the activist process. Second, it supplies the necessary identi…cation restriction to determine the scale of the activist's utility.
Econometric Methodology
Random Utility Model
The activist's optimization problem is an example of a dynamic discrete-choice model, whose solution can be obtained under the general assumptions of random utility theory. Under this formulation, a decision maker faces a choice among several alternatives. The agent knows the utility of each alternative (denoted by U in ) and selects the one with the greatest bene…t. The econometrician knows only some characteristics of the available choices which determine the agent's "observable" (representative) utility, U in . Generally, U in di¤ers from U in by an error term (also called a random utility component)
In the present context, the error captures unobservable factors that vary among activists with the same representative utility such as preference for (or experience with) a speci…c tactic.
Consider an exogenous sample of activists whose decision process is independent. The probability of activist i choosing alternative n is
where I is an indicator function equal to one when the expression in the parenthesis is correct.
The derivation of the choice probabilities requires solving a multidimensional integral, which takes a closed form only for some speci…cations of the error structure. 8 For example, assuming that the error terms are iid type I extreme value (Gumbel) results in the logit formulation.
In the logit model, the cumulative distribution of the random utility component " in 0 (given " in )
can be expressed as
Assuming that the choice of each activist is independent of the decisions of other activists, the above cumulative distribution for the whole sample is just the product of the individual cumulative distributions
Using the fact that the di¤erence between two extreme values is distributed logistic, the above 8 See Eckstein and Wolpin (1989) and Train (2003) for surveys of the literature on discrete-choice models.
expression takes the following closed form for a binary choice
Under a linear probability speci…cation, equation 10 can be rewritten as
The theoretical model described in the previous section can be easily translated into a regression equation and estimated by a binary logit model for each stage, in which p in is the probability of campaign continuation and (1 p in ) is the complementary probability of exit.
Statistical Backward Induction
I estimate the costs of the three stages of activism using statistical backward induction, in which the assumptions of random utility theory are combined with the intuition of backward induction.
In particular, …rst I estimate a binary logit model for the last decision stage (board representation),
where the activist chooses whether to continue to a proxy contest or exit. 9 Based on the activist's break-even pro…t constraint (see equation 2), I derive the minimum cost threshold associated with continuation to the proxy phase. Then, I use the estimated cost of the last stage as an input in the calculation of the cost of board representation, which is itself a result of a binary logit model based on the sample of activists who reach that stage (see equation 6), and so on.
The main advantage of statistical backward induction is its close relationship to the structural model described in the previous section. In fact, the regression equation is a random utility transformation of the activist's break-even constraint presented in equations 1 to 7. In addition, the economic model provides the identi…cation restriction required for consistent estimates of the cost parameters (see the next section).
The transformation also reduces the measurement error induced by our imperfect knowledge of the activist's utility from each decision alternative. Speci…cally, the regression equation does not include a multiplicative term of the probability of campaign success, p in , and the potential reward from activism, V in , which mitigates the consequences of the measurement error in the individual variables. In addition, scaling V in by the market price provides a more stable measure of return.
The one disadvantage of statistical backward induction is the bias it induces in the standard errors of the earlier stages (demand negotiations and board representation) due to the recursive use of the cost estimates for the proxy stage. However, this bias can be corrected by non-parametric 9 I exclude successful campaigns from the estimation sample.
bootstrapping, in which repeated sampling from the activist dataset can be used to estimate the error terms.
The activist's decision upon failure at the penultimate stage can be rewritten under the assumptions of random utility theory as follows
The …rst two terms determine the activist's representative utility and the error term " i3 is the (activist-speci…c) random utility component associated with the proxy phase.
A similar transformation can be performed for the earlier stages of the process. The regression equation for the decision at the end of failed demand negotiations becomes
The estimating equation for the decision to initiate demand negotiations can be written in a similar way by transforming equation 7.
Notice that the regression for each stage contains the same two theoretically-motivated explanatory variables -the inverse of the activist's marked-to-market investment, ( in M in ) 1 , and the expected gross return in a successful campaign, (V in =M in ), where n is the current stage. As a result, the activist's decision process can be translated into the following logistic regression
The described estimation procedure is a combination of conditional binary logistic regressions for every phase of the activist process and statistical backward induction. The coe¢ cient^ 1 in each stage-speci…c estimation determines (up to scale) the costs of continuation to that stage. The identi…cation of the absolute value of the costs requires an additional restriction to determine the scale of each logistic regression (as described in the next section).
The chosen estimation procedure o¤ers signi…cant advantages to alternative discrete-choice models (such as the multinomial or ordered logit). First, it allows for an evaluation of the di¤erential impact of the covariates on each transition by estimating a di¤erent vector of coe¢ cients for each stage. Second, it does not impose the unreasonable assumption that the activist chooses the maximum e¤ort level at the start of the campaign (implicit in the above alternatives). Third, statistical backward induction preserves the main structural elements of the activist's economic decision-making process. In addition, the transformed equation is simple to estimate by standard statistical software and o¤ers an alternative to more complex simulation techniques, which require explicit distributional assumptions for the parameters of interest.
A key challenge in studying the activist's behavior is the calculation of the expected return from activism (denoted by V in =M in in the theoretical model). Exogenous return measures are inappropriate because they already include the market's expectation of the intervention outcome.
Instead, I compute the expected bene…ts from activism by estimating a maximum potential …rm value, which equals the target's valuation if the proposed demands are successfully implemented. 10 A natural way to estimate a target's maximum value is to compare it to a better performing peer, and take the di¤erence in the chosen measure as the potential reward from activism. Both …rms need to be matched by fundamentals, which may include the target's industry as well as other …rm-level characteristics. I have chosen to use the …rm's industry (three-digit SIC code) as the only determinant of the discount for two reasons. First, practitioners rarely use anything other than an industry benchmark in estimating relative performance. Second, choosing …rm-level characteristics that remain una¤ected by the activist's corrective actions is di¢ cult (if not impossible) due to the wide variety of activist demands.
I calculate the activist's expected reward as a proportion of the gap between the target's Tobin's q and the highest (winsorized) industry q. The percentage is calibrated to the actual percent revaluation of the targets involved in successful campaigns during the sample period, which is estimated from the data at 30% (x in the formula below). Speci…cally, each quarter, I compute the di¤erence between the target's and the industry's q ratios. In order to limit the impact of outliers, I …x this di¤erence to the minimum of the gap at the start of the campaign or at the beginning of each stage. As a last step, I convert the expected reward in terms of potential revaluation of the target if the activist's demands are successfully executed.
V in = in bva T obin 0 s q + x min(gap1; gap2) gap1 = industry q f irm q at the start of the campaign gap2 = industry q f irm q at the beginning of each stage bva = book value of assets at the beginning of each stage
Identi…cation
The logit formulation in equations 9 to 11 is derived under the assumption that the random utility component in the activist's decision-making is distributed type I extreme value (Gumbel) with variance 2 =6. Setting the variance to this particular value is equivalent to normalizing the scale of utility (see Train 2003) . For example, we can rewrite the general random utility representation in the following way
where the transformed error term " in has variance 2 =6 2 . This underidenti…cation poses a signi…cant problem in determining the absolute value of the cost thresholds because they are derived from the regression coe¢ cients at each stage and those are scaled by 1= , i.e.
=
As a result, the costs cannot be identi…ed without further assumptions. In general, …nding an identifying restriction is impossible without a structural model that determines the relationship between the main explanatory variables and the parameters of interest. In the present setup, the economic model provides the following identifying restriction
As described in the next section, the sample of activists making a (conditional) decision at each stage of the process is di¤erent. This implies that the variance of the unobserved activist heterogeneity (captured by the scale parameter of the logistic distribution) is also likely to be di¤erent at every stage. In fact, we expect the scale parameter to become smaller with every consecutive phase as the activists employing more confrontational tactics are fewer and more homogeneous.
Consequently, estimating a stage-speci…c variance parameter provides more precise estimates of the cost thresholds.
Descriptive Evidence
De…ning activism as a sequential process allows me to describe its evolution in signi…cantly more detail than previous academic studies. Speci…cally, I am able to characterize the progression of activism through its stages both across time and across …rms and answer many important questions:
Has activism become more confrontational over time? Does the activist's committed capital depend on the level of engagement? Do more hostile approaches have higher success rates? In this section, I attempt to give a more in-depth description of shareholder activism. Table 1 but do not show the evolution of these preferences over time.
Insert Table 1 Table 2 describes the progression of a typical campaign across the stages of the activist process.
The …rst two columns summarize the data for the full activist sample, while the last two columns present the same results for the targets remaining after the CRSP-Compustat merge. In describing the evolution of the average campaign, I focus on the full sample. 70% of activists quit before making formal demands to the target. This suggests that the transition to demand negotiations represents a signi…cant impediment in the overall process. There is a 20% chance that the average activist will request board representation, and a 7% chance that he/she will threaten a proxy contest. Surprisingly, there is less than 5% chance of actually waging a proxy …ght even though this stage has the highest success rate (see below).
Insert Table 2 The behavior. In the empirical section, I show that both …xed e¤ects are statistically signi…cant.
Insert Table 3 One of the main criticisms against hedge fund activists is their allegedly short-term investment horizon. Most critics argue that hedge funds "masquerade" as activists but their true goal is to make a quick pro…t at the expense of long-term shareholders. However, a closer look at the data reveals that the average duration of an activist campaign is 16 months. Excluding the events in which no formal demands were announced raises the average campaign horizon to 18 months. Brav, Jiang, Partnoy and Thomas (2008) report a similar average duration (20 months) for the campaigns in their sample.
The duration of each distinct phase of the activist process is more important for the purposes of this study. The structural model presented above implicitly assumes a standard stage duration equal to the time interval between two annual meetings (in some cases 6-8 quarters). Table 4 provides empirical support for this assumption. Substantially all activist campaigns have stage durations shorter than 6 quarters. A minor exception is the board representation stage, in which about 8% of the campaigns exceed 8 quarters but virtually all are less than 10 quarters. Overall, the assumption of a standard stage length seems to be empirically justi…ed.
Insert Table 4 What is the activist's capital commitment during a campaign? The mean (median) percentage stake is 9.7% (8.0%) of the target's outstanding shares. However, the activist's dollar stake represents a better measure of resource commitment because most of the targets are small companies.
The mean (median) dollar stake at entry is $60.40M ($11.28M), while the mean (median) maximum stake over the duration of the campaign is $88.94M ($18.12M).
A more interesting question is whether activists vary their ownership with the tactics they employ. Intuitively, we would expect that more confrontational approaches will be associated with larger blockholdings. Table 5 con…rms this general intuition. The mean dollar investment increases across the stages of the process, even though the proxy contest stage has a slightly lower ownership than the board representation phase.
Insert Table 5 The classi…cation of demands employed in this paper is a signi…cant departure from the previous empirical studies of hedge fund activism. Both Brav, Jiang, Partnoy and Thomas (2008) Table 6 con…rms that in less than 5% of all events the principal demand is corporate-governance related (CEO removal or 'poison pill'termination).
Insert Table 6 The most common activist demand is a sale of the company to a third party (one third of all In measuring the success rate of the distinct stages of the activist process, I exclude campaigns with fewer than two regulatory …lings and large ownership stocks ( 29.99%). I …nd that more confrontational activist tactics have a higher probability of success. The most successful activist phase is the proxy contest, in which 67.19% of activists achieve their objectives (table 7) . Proxy threats are e¤ective in 47.89% of the cases while 47.80% of activists achieve success through board representation. This compares to a meager 6.67% success rate of demand negotiations. However, less than 5% of all campaigns reach the proxy stage, which implies that the costs rather than expected success rates determine the manager's ability to progress through the activist process.
Insert Table 7 Even though the focus in this paper is on the activist, I con…rm that the distribution of the targets in my sample is similar to that in previous studies of hedge fund activism. 
Empirical Results
Cost Thresholds
The main parameters of interest in this study are the cost thresholds associated with the stages of the activist process. To provide more robust estimates, I combine the proxy threat and proxy …ght into a 'proxy contest'stage resulting in three distinct phases -demand negotiations, board representation and proxy contest. To improve the model …t, I also exclude campaigns that end in a business combination (M&A transaction) without the activist's explicit involvement and interventions whose resolution is not within the sample period of 2000 to 2007 (right-censored observations).
As described in equations 1 to 7, each cost cuto¤ can be estimated from the break-even utility of the activist and represents a lower bound on the costs of employing a particular engagement In order to identify the absolute value of the cost thresholds, I estimate the scale of each logistic regression by applying a restriction provided by the economic model (equation 15). The scale parameter can be thought of as a measure of the in ‡uence of unobserved activist heterogeneity on the logistic estimation procedure. As a result of the signi…cantly lower number of activist campaigns that reach the more confrontational stages, the proxy contest has the lowest scale parameter and the negotiations phase has the highest scale parameter (see table 8 ).
Insert Table 8   Table 8 As seen in table 8, the cost of the average campaign that reaches a proxy …ght is $10.5 million.
In terms of invested capital, this amount represents 12% of the mean activist ownership stake. Insert Table 9   Table 10 presents additional information about each stage-speci…c binary logistic regression. Insert Table 10 The estimated monitoring costs are economically signi…cant both in absolute terms and in terms of net returns. In table 11, I compute both gross and net (of costs) raw deal returns. The median average gross return is close to zero (1.31%) but the average gross return is highly positive (55.69%), mainly due to the outsize in ‡uence of campaigns that achieve success in the board representation stage. Subtracting costs signi…cantly reduces deal returns. The median net return drops to negative 2.10% while the mean net return goes down to positive 19.4%. It is also interesting to notice that the proxy contest stage has the lowest gross and net deal returns implying that the proxy process may be value-destroying at least from the point of view of the activist.
Insert Table 11 7
.2 Robustness
Campaigns by the same hedge fund activist are likely to violate the assumption of independent observations. For example, a hedge fund manager may have a preference for (or more experience with) a speci…c activist tactic. With no explicit correction for the e¤ects of clustered data, the usual standard errors will be incorrect and the estimated con…dence intervals biased. However, taking into account clustering by hedge fund activist does not qualitatively change the estimation results.
Simultaneously with the correction for clustered observations, I compute robust standard errors, which are also known as Huber-White or sandwich errors. This correction allows for model misspeci…cation -for instance, …tting an incorrect likelihood function. When a model is misspeci…ed, the usual standard errors are incorrect. In this case, the estimator is known as the minimum ignorance estimator (White 1982). As described in the previous section, the results remain signi…cant even when allowing for model misspeci…cation.
A more direct way to correct for unobserved activist heterogeneity is to include activist-speci…c attributes and study their e¤ect on the estimation. Table 12 Insert Table 12 The included activist characteristics have high explanatory power and signi…cantly improve the model …t. The three additional covariates have the highest economic signi…cance in the last stage regression. For example, the number of ongoing campaigns by the same hedge fund negatively a¤ects the likelihood of waging a proxy …ght. Also, the results suggest that a …rm targeted by a hostile activist is more likely to reach a confrontational stage, while a …rm targeted by a more experienced activist is less likely to make that transition. Currently, I am performing additional analyses, which include estimating the costs of monitoring conditional on the size and style of the activist hedge fund.
Due to the recursive backward substitution of estimated costs, the procedure of statistical backward induction yields biased estimates of the standard errors in the …rst two stages (board representation and demand negotiations). To correct this bias, I use a non-parametric bootstrap method, which relies on simulation to calculate the standard errors. Essentially, bootstrapping involves repeated sampling (with replacement) from the dataset at hand to estimate the error terms. The implicit assumption in bootstrapping is that it is more reasonable to draw inferences from the sample at hand rather than make unrealistic assumptions about the underlying population.
I calculate bias-corrected bootstrap con…dence intervals for the cost estimates, where the bias correction adjusts for a potential bias in the tails of the sampling distribution. The bias-corrected bootstrap con…dence intervals are very similar to the normal con…dence intervals.
Concluding Remarks
The goal of this paper is to measure the costs of activist monitoring and provide a better understanding of the net gains from activism. I focus on the principal cost-bene…t trade-o¤ facing the activist and study its e¤ect on the choice of tactics in interacting with the target …rm. A decision to choose a more confrontational tactic implies that its bene…ts exceed its costs while a decision to exit suggests a negative trade-o¤.
At the heart of this paper is a novel formulation of shareholder activism as a sequential decision process, in which a more hostile tactic is conditional on having passed through less confrontational I also describe the activist process in signi…cantly more detail than previous academic studies. I …nd that the considerable cost of transitioning to the …rst stage of demand negotiations is the main 'bottleneck' of the process, resulting in a 70% exit rate. Less than 5% of all campaigns reach a proxy contest even though the proxy stage has a 67% success rate. Using a more narrow de…nition of success, I estimate the overall success rate of activism as 19.11%, signi…cantly lower that previous studies.
The results support two main arguments. First, the private nature of activist-target negotiations makes it impossible to assess the costs of monitoring from publicly available information. This paper is the …rst attempt in the literature to estimate these costs using a structural approach. Second, the high costs and low success rate of activism suggest that its net gains are substantially lower than previously thought. Note: Schedule 13G is an alternative SEC …ling for the 13D which must be …led by anyone who acquires bene…cial ownership in a public company (i.e. owns more than 5% of a company). The 13G …ling is considered a more passive version of the 13D, and has fewer reporting requirements.
Activist practices are not permitted by 13G …lers unless they re-…le a 13D. 
19.11%
Exclusions: campaigns with fewer than two Schedule 13D …lings, large ownership stocks ( 29.99%):
Success is de…ned as the successful execution of the activist's original set of demands. Costs represent minimum thresholds and are estimated by binary logit models (continuation=1, exit=0).
Bias-corrected bootstrap con…dence intervals. Stage-speci…c scale identi…es the model coe¢ cients. Results from stage-speci…c binary logistic regressions. Marked-to-market investment is the inverse of the activist's current stake; expected gross return equals the expected …rm value if the campaign is successful scaled by the current market value. Expected …rm value is estimated in terms of the …rm's gap from the industry's q ratio. Clustered standard errors. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
